

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249041483>

Social capital or human capital? Professionals in overseas Taiwanese firms

Article in *Journal of Contemporary Asia* · January 2002

DOI: 10.1080/00472330280000241

CITATIONS

15

READS

39

2 authors, including:



Hong-zen Wang

National Sun Yat-sen University

40 PUBLICATIONS 627 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:



Industrial relations in Vietnam [View project](#)



Vietnamese wife [View project](#)

Social Capital or Human Capital? Professionals in Overseas Taiwanese Firms

Hong-zen Wang* & H.H. Michael Hsiao**

[**Abstract:** This article seeks to explore the influence of social capital on the decision to hire Chinese professionals to work for Taiwanese companies in Vietnam. We argue that this employment and migration pattern is mainly determined by the social capital of the Chinese professional transient, and is not based solely on economic calculation as push-pull economic theory describes.]

One significant trend in the era of globalisation is the mass migration of labour between different countries. According to the ILO, the number of labour receiving countries and sending countries increased from 64 in 1970 to 100 in 1990 (ILO, 1999). There has also been a great deal of research on migration in Asia (Stahl, 2000; Tsay, 1999; Tajima, 1998; Low 1995; Castles, 1998).

One new migration phenomenon is Chinese professionals migrating to other countries. It is very different from blue-collar workers' migration. From the employers' perspective, what is the rationale for hiring short-term contracted temporary migrant professionals, or "professional transients"? This is the main theme of our article.

Our discussion will focus on the roles of Chinese professionals in the overseas Taiwan companies in Vietnam. It will be argued that the reasons for hiring these professional transients to work are not only based on economic cost. The social capital of these Chinese professionals is the main reason why Taiwan companies hire them.¹ Many theories have tried to explain the migration patterns. The economic pull-push migration dual sectors model is well developed by Fei and Ranis to describe the flow of labour force from subsistence sector to industrial sector (1964). This model tends to see migration as being caused by individual economic calculation. In this model, the migrants seem able to calculate their financial returns in the host country and to compare their options. However, this model is based on unlimited labour supply conditions. If we observe the migration patterns from the demand side, we would wonder why employers select certain groups of people to work for them, and not others. In our case, why do Taiwanese companies recruit professionals from China, and not from other countries?

For a long time, there have been debates about the ethnic resources of overseas Chinese community. Granovetter argues that social ties can, under specified conditions, equip the firms with necessary resources to prosper in the modern world (1995). Wong's research on the economic activities of Shanghai businesspeople in Hong Kong also

*Dept. of Marketing, Chung Hsing University, Taiwan **Asia-Pacific Research Program, Academia Sinica, Taipei
This research is supported by a grant from the Taiwan National Science Council, Taiwan. The authors are grateful to Dr. Ching-lung Tsay, Dr. Sue-ching Jou, Dr. I-chun Kung, Dr. Han-pi Chang and Dr. Yen-fen Tseng for their valuable comments.

shows the importance of ethnic relations in conducting business (1979). Greenhalgh observes that "among the Chinese on Taiwan, as among the Chinese generally, there is a strong preference for economic relationships based on prior acquaintance and trust" (1984:535). Hamilton and Kao wrote that personal networks are very important when conducting business with other companies. When one has broader networks, one is more powerful. The relationships tend to be stable over the long term, and are based on reciprocal trust, loyalty and predictability (1990:145-146). However, all these findings are subject to the criticism of cultural reductionism that ethnic resources serve as a repertoire that people who live within this cultural context can hold access to indefinitely (Wang, 1999:8).

A weaker hypothesis proposed by the so-called "relational embeddedness" suggests that "in a dyadic or triadic situation, expectations of reciprocity are based exclusively on past knowledge of other actors and the ability of each individual to withhold resources or apply sanctions if expectations are not satisfied" (Portes, 1995:13). This conforms to Wang's finding in Taiwan that a long-term relationship is based on mutual trust and reciprocity, with the help of economic calculations (Wang, 1999:155-164). In her research, Kung also notes that the interviewed Taiwanese companies in Malaysia complained that money defaults are mostly with other Taiwanese enterprises in Malaysia (1999). The so-called *ganqing* (affection) has trapped them in the problem of default, as they did not take economic calculations into account. We expect that the long-term relationship will become disorganized if mutual benefits cannot be maintained.

Following this string of theoretical exploration, we would like to inquire whether the hiring of Chinese professionals to work for Taiwanese companies in Vietnam is only based on economic calculation, or if relational embeddedness plays a more important role in their employment. We will argue that the "Taiwan experience" and a common language, a kind of social capital, is the determining factor for Taiwanese companies in hiring Chinese professionals.

The data analyzed here is based on our fieldwork research in Vietnam from December 1998 to August 1999. We have interviewed 54 informants, including 41 companies, and 6 former and present Taiwan government officials in Vietnam.

Overseas Taiwan Capital in Vietnam

The sharp appreciation of the Taiwan dollar in the mid-1980s was one of the major reasons to shift production lines overseas. According to a 1991 survey conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, what also pushed companies to make such investments was not only the exchange rate, but also rising labour costs and land costs (55%, 40% and 39%); and the three main attractions overseas were cheap labor costs, a developing overseas market and a desire to sell products from within the local market (67%, 54%, 30% out of five hundred and seventy-four firms sampled).² After 1991, the reasons for investing overseas changed slightly. Utilizing cheap labour remains important, but not as significant as before. For those firms investing between 1987 and 1991, 67% singled out cheap labour as the main reason to invest overseas, a percentage that declined to 55% for firms investing after 1995. The potential local market and an effort to produce locally for Taiwan's buyers gained weight after 1995 (see Table 1).

Table 1: Reasons to Invest Overseas

Firm Size by Employee	Local Market Potential	Request from Overseas Buyers	Follow Taiwan's Buyers	Globalisation	Cheap Labor	Domestic Investment Milieu Deteriorated
> 300	59.8	25.4	14.8	44.9	55.5	26.3
> 100	50.0	23.4	14.1	34.8	56.5	30.4
< 99	46.9	24.4	22.3	19.6	67.4	36.0
Year of Overseas Investment						
Before 1986	65.6	16.4	14.8	27.8	62.3	24.6
1987-91	44.7	26.0	15.7	26.7	67.3	34.8
1992-94	48.9	24.8	20.6	24.5	64.5	37.0
After 1995	56.8	22.7	27.3	29.6	55.0	23.6
Investment by Area						
China	48.8	22.1	24.5	19.4	72.1	38.2
Hong Kong	58.8	41.2	27.5	52.9	31.4	15.7
USA	70.4	38.9	8.3	43.5	22.2	10.2
Malaysia	43.3	34.3	7.5	43.3	53.7	26.9
Singapore	66.7	33.3	11.1	50.0	27.8	11.1
Thailand	40.6	14.5	14.5	33.3	69.6	36.2
Indonesia	47.4	15.8	7.9	13.2	79.0	34.2
Philippines	22.7	22.7	0.0	40.9	81.8	50.0
Vietnam	24.4	15.6	11.1	26.7	64.4	40.0
Average	49.6	24.5	19.8	26.3	63.7	33.5

Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu (Statistics Section, MOEA), *Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian* (Survey on Overseas Investment of the Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1996) (Taipei: MOEA, 1997), pp. 70-73, Table 4.

Note: The questions are multiple choice, so the sum of the percents is more than 100.

Tables 2 and 3 show the amounts Taiwanese companies invested overseas in a range of Asian countries. This overseas investment increased sharply after 1986. Before 1990, most overseas investment poured into Southeast Asia, but after the easing of political tensions between Taiwan and China, and the development of China's economy, huge amounts of Taiwanese capital flowed into China, starting in 1991. Up to the end of 1997, China absorbed about half of the Taiwanese capital invested overseas. After 1997, however, the amount flowing into China decreased due to the Taiwan government's "Go Slow Toward China"³ policy, which was intended to counterbalance China's military exercises from July 1995 to March 1996. The investment amount flowing into Southeast Asia was also reduced because of the financial crisis from mid-1997 to now.

Table 2: Areas and Annual Amount of Overseas Investment (1986-2000)

Year	Thailand		Malaysia		Philippines		Indonesia		Singapore		Vietnam		Total	
	Cases	Amount	Cases	Amount	Cases	Amount	Cases	Amount	Cases	Amount	Cases	Amount	Cases	Amount
59-89	120	345.15	175	151.23	97	16.81	10	2,660.55	64	465.30	0	0	466	3,639.04
88	308	859.90	111	306.12	86	109.90	16	913.00	3	6.40	0	0	524	2,195.32
89	214	892.20	191	799.70	190	148.70	19	513.20	6	5.20	1	1.00	621	2,360.00
90	144	782.70	270	2,347.83	158	140.70	94	618.30	10	47.60	17	251.00	693	4,188.13
91	69	583.50	182	1,326.17	109	12.00	58	1,057.30	13	12.50	36	520.90	467	3,512.37
92	44	289.90	137	574.70	27	9.10	23	563.30	11	8.80	37	561.60	279	2,007.40
93	61	215.40	86	331.18	21	5.40	20	127.50	12	69.50	49	421.30	249	1,170.28
94	88	477.50	100	1,122.76	42	267.80	48	2,487.50	19	100.70	78	518.60	375	4,974.86
95	102	1,803.90	123	567.80	34	13.60	89	567.40	20	31.60	65	1,239.70	433	4,224.00
96	66	2,785.20	79	310.40	22	7.40	111	534.60	54	165.00	48	534.30	380	4,336.90
97	62	414.30	63	480.40	16	13.10	101	3,419.40	27	230.30	68	247.80	337	4,805.30
98	69	253.60	74	263.40	19	5.41	91	165.45	56	158.18	72	268.30	381	1,114.34
99	86	211.10	66	70.26	18	4.98	91	3,309.70	19	324.52	92	172.99	372	4,093.55
2000	70	264.57	44	117.95	2	0.39	33	32.60	10	101.94	70	134.60	229	652.05
--Jun														
Sub total	1,503	10,178.92	1,701	8,769.90	841	755.29	804	16,969.80	324	1,727.54	634	4,872.00	5,806	43,273.54

Source: Originally from Thailand BOI, Malaysia MIDA, the Philippines BOI, Indonesia BKPM, Vietnam SCCI, Investment Commission, MOEA. Cited from Touzi Yewuchu (Investment Department, MOEA), *Woguo zai Dongxigie Geguo Touzi Tongji Jianxi (Brief Analysis of Taiwan's Investment in ASEAN)* (Taipei: Industrial Development and Investment Center, http://www.idic.gov.tw/html/b_frame.html, 2000/9/26).

Table 3 shows that most of Taiwan's overseas investment capital went into China. A company investing in China might want to diversify their investment in other areas. We see from Table 4 that those companies which have already invested in China would like to invest in Southeast Asia, and Vietnam is their preferred choice.

Table 3: Areas and Annual Amount of Overseas Investment in China (1993-2000)
unit: million US\$

Year	Cases	Agreed Amount	Realized Amount
1993	10,948	9,965	3,139
1994	6,247	5,395	3,391
1995	4,778	5,777	3,162
1996	3,184	5,141	3,475
1997	3,014	2,814	3,289
1998	2,970	2,982	2,599
1999	2,499	3,374	2,599
2000 (-Mar)	581	881	411
Subtotal	44,535	45,409	24,536

Source: *Taishang zai Dalu Touzi Gaikuang (Taiwanese Businesspeople's Situation in Mainland China)* (Taipei: Industrial Development and Investment Center, http://www.idic.gov.tw/html/b_frame.html, 2000/9/26).

Table 4: If You Want to Increase Your Overseas Branches, Where Will You Invest?
(multiple choice)

Where to go	China	USA	Vietnam	Malaysia	Thailand	Indonesia	Philippines	Subtotal
Invest in...								
Total	55.4	18.1	17.1	13.8	11.8	9.2	8.1	60.0
USA	43.8	36.5	5.2	10.4	5.2	6.3	5.2	32.3
China	54.5	17.8	20.6	12.6	13.3	10.4	10.2	67.1
Malaysia	67.4	6.5	13.0	23.9	17.4	6.5	4.4	65.2
Singapore	75.0	37.5	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	12.5	25.0
Thailand	66.7	12.8	7.7	23.1	2.6	2.6	2.6	38.6
Indonesia	50.0	0.0	9.1	13.6	0.0	31.8	0.0	54.5
Philippines	72.2	11.1	27.8	16.7	5.6	0.0	27.8	77.9

Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu (1999:21 table 6.5.2).

Vietnam became a major destination for Taiwanese capital after 1995, after a few cautious contacts between the two countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁴ One informant said that his and other companies organized a tour to Vietnam in 1988, and began to negotiate with the Vietnamese government from 1991. At that time, many companies were persuaded by former president Lee Teng-hui to go there to invest. His

company later decided to invest there. Why? According to his calculation, when the cost of one article of clothing can be reduced by NT\$10 (about US\$0.33 at the exchange rate of US\$1 to NT\$30 in 1999), the returns on the investment would be more than 100% in one year. The main cost reduction comes from labor costs. He said proudly that within one year after the factory site was built in 1996, all the investment capital had been paid off.

Obviously labor cost is one attractive factor for investing Taiwanese capital in Vietnam. The 1998 survey done by the MOEA shows that cheap labor cost is the most important factor for Taiwan businesspeople to invest in Vietnam. The second most important factor is the potential domestic market there. One informant produces toilets for Vietnam's domestic market. After the lifting of the American trade embargo, Ho Chi Minh City experienced a construction boom, which made him decide to invest there to meet the demands of the expanding housing market in the region.

Another motivation is to re-export the products to Taiwan and other destinations. The 1998 survey shows that 41% of Taiwanese company's products were sold in the local market, while about one-quarter was re-exported to Taiwan, and another one-third was aimed at other export markets (Jingjibu Tongjichu, 1999:27, Table 4-4). One informant received orders from USA customers in Taiwan, and put out the production to her garment factory in Hanoi. This kind of triangular production has become very common since Taiwanese companies shifted their factories out to China and Southeast Asia (Cheng, 1999:3-46). Wang has argued that this kind of financial operation enables them to evade tax and keep the profit in the mother country (Wang, 2001). Some informants, mainly machinery factories, mentioned the effect of the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area). That is, it is important for their products to establish a hub in ASEAN countries to take advantage of the free trade zone. One motorbike components factory near Hanoi, following the Chin-fong Motorbike assembly factory to invest in Vietnam, said that his company aims at Vietnam's domestic market and the AFTA market. At that moment, the cost of producing in Vietnam was much higher than in China, but the protection of high tariffs enabled the factory to survive, and all products would enjoy preferential tariffs in the AFTA area.

Who Invests Overseas?

In a survey conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1996, 47% of the large enterprises (over three hundred employees) surveyed had already invested overseas, while only 29% of the firms employing less than three hundred but more than one hundred workers had done so. The figure fell to 25% for firms employing less than a hundred workers (Jingjibu Tongjichu, 1995:40, Table 50-1). The percentage of SMEs investing overseas is obviously quite high. Electronics (25%), plastics products (11%), metallic products (9%) and textiles (5%) are the four main industries which invest overseas (Jingjibu Tongjichu, 1997:46-49, Table 2-4).

A Ministry of Economic Affairs survey in 1991 found that most intensive-intensive industries, especially those firms which had invested in China, reduced or stopped their domestic production, while heavy industries either maintained or expanded their production scale. This means that SMEs that were not internationally competitive found that they had to move their production lines abroad, while for big firms overseas investment is a

business strategy to adjust and expand their global production. This kind of SME overseas investment is much like Japanese overseas direct investments before the mid-1980s, which aimed at securing a local market or for re-export to the US market.⁵ This is different from a multinational company, which sets its marketing strategy and components production according to different regions' economic situation. For example, a Japanese multinational company has invested in Malaysia to produce VCRs, but its components are derived from one hundred and seventeen firms producing in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Australia.⁶ The 1996 survey shows that the three main reasons for big firms that employ over three hundred workers to invest overseas are: to enter the local market (60%), cheap intensive (56%) and globalising their business (45%). For SMEs employing less than a hundred workers, finding cheap labor (67%) is more important. However, entering the local market is another important reason (47%), as is a new trend to follow Taiwan's buyers by going overseas to invest (22%).

According to a 1998 survey by the MOEA, the most popular destination for Taiwan capital was still China (71% of total surveyed firms), followed by the six ASEAN countries⁷ (37%) and the USA (17%) (Jingjibu Tongjichu, 1999:4, Table 2.2.1). For small enterprises, their capital is almost entirely confined to one country. 76% of these small enterprises invested in China, 37% of them invested in ASEAN, and only 9.5% went to the USA. For middle-sized enterprises, the percentage of investment in China is only 65%, and 34% in ASEAN, while as many as 23% invested in the USA. This reflects the recent rapid developments in the electronics industry, which is characterized by the emergence of some large IT companies that have followed the development steps of America's Silicon Valley. The big scale enterprises not only invest in China (77%), but also in ASEAN (51%) and the USA (40%). If so, it would be easy for the big transnational enterprises to allocate the labor force among different firms in this region.

Vietnam is one of the favorite destinations for Taiwan SMEs to make future investments. The survey held in 1999 shows that 74% of overseas Taiwan small businesses invested in China, 9.7% in the USA and 6.7% in Vietnam.¹⁸ Garments and textiles are the main items produced by Taiwanese investors there (see Table 4).

In addition to the companies which had registered at the government office, according to our fieldwork survey, there are many companies who did not register as a Taiwanese company. They wanted to evade the strict government regulation on foreign investment, e.g., the restriction on sales in the domestic market, or to evade the minimum wage requirement for workers in foreign companies. In Malaysia, the government regulates that there must be at least two local shareholders in a foreign invested company. A common way to evade these regulations is to ask a local person who contributes very little to be a shareholder, but the real business is controlled by the Taiwan investors. These are practices used to evade the state's regulations. Normally these companies are not well operated, and we have heard of a lot of cases that went bankrupt in the end. One interviewee told me that he cooperated with an ethnic Chinese in Ho Chi Minh City from 1992. He offered technology and markets, while the counterpart provided the working site. The company was registered by the Chinese Vietnamese. After two years of cooperation, the relationship turned sour because the partner asked for a higher profit

share. The informant's refusal broke up the relationship, and the Vietnamese partner took control of all of the property overnight.

Another kind of Taiwanese investment which does not show up in official statistics is the investment via the third country. The port operation next to Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone is run by Evergreen Group, which invested in this project via its subsidiary company in Singapore. Another big company, Hua-long, has also invested in Vietnam through its Malaysian company. If these investments are counted as part of Taiwanese investment, Taiwan is the largest foreign investor in Vietnam.

Transnational Corporations and Labor Migration

A general pattern of Asian labor migration direction is from developing Asian countries north to Japan and the NIEs, and the skilled workers and professionals are moving south in the opposite direction. It has been found that professionals and skilled workers from Singapore have moved to Malaysia and Indonesia, creating a growth triangle. This kind of mobility is usually accompanied by overseas investment and trade and technology flows (Low, 1995:748). It is not surprising therefore that Taiwanese companies assign Taiwan professionals or skilled workers to work in Southeast Asia or China. These people are called "professional transients" (Castles, 1998:219).

There are no official statistics on professional labour migration to other countries in Taiwan. According to a rough estimation, there could be as many as 200,000 Taiwanese skilled workers in China (Huang, Wu and Zhang, 2000:175). Table 5 shows that the main technical sources of overseas branches are mostly from Taiwan, which must be carried out by Taiwanese skilled workers.

Table 5: Main Sources of Technology in Overseas Branch (multi choice)

	Taiwan Mother Co.	Developed by Over- seas Branch	Offered by Partner	Research Project	Accept Consult	Purchase	Learn from other Co.
Survey in 1996	90.47	14.71	13.19	7.01	6.55	2.7	2.74
Survey in 1998	87.33	17.26	12.19	7.92	6.02	3.3	7.28
<i>Small</i>	87.17	17.93	11.52	8.38	6.94	3.0	9.55
<i>Medium-Large</i>	87.58	16.23	13.23	7.21	4.61	3.8	3.81

Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu, Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha (Survey on Manufacturing Industry's Overseas Investment) cited from <http://www.moea.gov.tw/~meco/stat/four/inv87/c.htm>, 2000/4/17.

We use the sum of the percentage in different areas as the index of "cross-border overseas investment." If the index is 100%, it will mean that the company just invests in one country without any cross-border overseas investment. The higher the index, the more countries a firm invests in. Table 6 shows that the sum of "cross-border overseas investment" for small enterprises is only 124%, and middle-scale enterprises is 135%, while large-scale companies is 183%. This means that almost every large-scale company

invests in two or more countries.

Table 6: Investment Area, by Enterprise Size (multiple-choice); unit: %

	Total	Small	Medium	Large
China	71.12	75.92	65.19	77.19
Malaysia	8.62	7.59	8.86	12.28
Thailand	7.44	6.28	6.96	9.65
Indonesia	6.8	6.68	5.06	7.6
Vietnam	6.72	6.54	3.8	9.06
Philippines	4.51	3.53	5.7	6.73
Singapore	2.93	1.96	3.8	5.56
Sub-total	37.02	32.58	34.18	50.88
USA	17.48	9.55	23.42	40.06
HK	8.47	6.02	12.66	15.5
Total	134.09	124.07	135.45	183.63

Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu (1999:4 table 2.2.1).

Since large-scale enterprise invests in many countries, its global strategic planning try to allocate its capital and labor force efficiently. If there were no national borders, we could imagine that a big enterprise could easily assign labour forces to different firms according to the maximum efficiency principle. In the era of globalisation, labour migration across borders is not so difficult as it once was, and professionals in a big enterprise may be assigned to different countries.

Rationale to Hire Chinese Professional Transients

Most Taiwanese companies are aware of the employment of Chinese professionals. The MOEA's survey in 1998 reveals that more than 35% of interviewed companies which have invested overseas have employed, or have tried to employ, Chinese professionals to work for them (see Table 7). This is particularly true for big enterprises, which show more interest in hiring Chinese professionals to work.

Table 7: Have You Tried to Hire Chinese Professionals

	Total	Have Hired	Want to hire	Don't want	No opportunity
Total	100.00	2.53	34.49	31.80	31.17
Small Scale	100.00	1.96	31.68	35.34	31.02
Medium Scale	100.00	1.90	41.77	29.75	26.58
Large Scale	100.00	4.09	37.43	24.85	33.63

Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu (1998:25, table 7.2.2).

According to Chinese statistics, there were 425,667 people who had provided their labour services abroad by the end of 1999 (MOFTEC, 2000/11/15). There are no official statistics on Chinese professional transients in Vietnam. The Vietnamese government does not allow Chinese to work there unless one is hired through internal corporation transfer to help build up a new factory. However, according to our 1999 summer fieldwork data, 12 out of 28 interviewed companies (43%) hired Chinese to be middle-level cadres. Some of those not hiring Chinese professionals are considering recruiting them from China. In other words, it is a well-known phenomenon to employ Chinese professionals among Taiwanese companies. In her fieldwork trip to Indonesia in 2000, Kung also found that Taiwanese companies there also employed many Chinese professionals. We are therefore wondering why Taiwanese companies in Vietnam prefer to hire these Chinese?

In Vietnam four groups can be recruited to work as managers: Taiwanese professionals, Vietnamese-Chinese, Vietnamese and Chinese professionals. In the following section we will discuss the reasons why Taiwanese companies prefer to hire Chinese professionals.

Why Not Taiwanese Expatriates?

Any Taiwanese company that wants to invest overseas has to send its staff to handle the business overseas. Though senior managers are mostly from Taiwan, not all of these companies employ Taiwanese as managers. Economic cost is the major reason. Payment to Taiwanese expatriates is high compared to income in Taiwan. As seen from the company's perspective, the basic wage is 1.5 times higher than that in Taiwan, and an allowance paid to managers, with monthly overseas allowances ranging from US\$600 to US\$1,000 in China. Furthermore, the benefits package in Taiwan remains intact, and extra insurance must be purchased for expatriates to cover all risks. If an expatriate's two-year-term expires, s/he can choose to continue to work there. If so, all overseas benefits is raised 20% higher, and the allowance in third term is again raised 20% more than the second term. An expatriate manager will be promoted in rank if s/he is willing to extend her/his overseas term, and three promotions in rank is the maximum award (Huang and Si, 1998). If we say that a technician's wage in Taiwan is about NT\$50,000 (US\$1,700), and if s/he is sent to Vietnam to work, the wage could be as high as US\$2,500, plus allowance. As one informant described, one Chinese professional costs only US\$600 per month, but for Taiwanese managers, you would not be able to find anyone to work for you in Vietnam for a salary under US\$2,000.

If the company can find an equivalent professional from China, it will save a lot of money for the company. The average annual wage in China in 1997 is RMB\$6,470 (about US\$810), and in Shanghai the average wage is RMB\$11,425 (about US\$1,450). For those working in the private sector, wages are higher (US\$1,100 and US\$1,790 respectively) (China Statistics Department, 2000). Compared to a Taiwanese expatriate's monthly wage, hiring a Taiwanese cadre would be able to pay a Chinese professional for one year in China. Here lies the rationale behind hiring Chinese professionals to work in Vietnam.

Family problems are another reason which prevents Taiwanese from working overseas. The so-called "second wife" has become a social problem in both Taiwan and China. A report in Taiwan shows that anxiety about husband's affairs in Shanghai is the

main reason why Taiwanese wives have mixed feelings about their husbands' expatriation (China Times, 2000/09/04).

Why Not Vietnamese?

Many informants emphasized the importance of "localization" (Bentuhua). It means that a company uses more local material to produce, hires more local people to manage, and keeps the company running for a long time in Vietnam. However, it is not easy to realize this ideal.⁸

First, there is always a shortage of skilled labor in developing countries (Stahl, 2000:11). Taiwanese companies always complain that there is not enough skilled labor in Vietnam, and a university graduate is not qualified for work which could be performed by a vocational high school graduate in Taiwan. Furthermore, if Taiwanese companies want to internally promote a Vietnamese worker, it might take at least a few years. As we know, investment in Vietnam from Taiwan is a recent phenomenon. Table 2 shows that the rush to invest in Vietnam began from 1990, and reached its peak in 1995. Normally it takes about one to two years to decide whether to invest or not. After the decision is made, it takes about one year to build a factory. A big company went to Vietnam in 1991 to understand the investment milieu, and spent years bargaining with the Vietnamese government to get preferential land and tax allowances. The contract was finally signed in 1995, and a factory was completed in 1996.

Because the time to invest in Vietnam has not been long, a Vietnamese worker in a Taiwanese factory works at most for five years. If s/he works in the same company successively, the highest rank s/he can reach in a company's organization is supervisor (Kezhang).⁹ There are still a lot of senior positions over the supervisor. Managing a company requires not only floor level workers, but also middle and high level managers. In this situation, a Taiwanese company has to recruit managers outside instead of relying on internal promotion. In our 41 interview samples, the highest rank a Vietnamese achieved is supervisor. Most Vietnamese cadres are foremen and team heads, located near the bottom of the organizational hierarchy.

In addition, there is a language problem. Though some Taiwanese bosses or managers can speak Vietnamese, most of them still have to rely on interpretation. In her research on Malaysian Taiwanese companies, Kung also found that language is the main reason for Taiwanese bosses to employ ethnic Chinese there (Kung, 1999). Obviously, we should not neglect the language barrier's influence on management.

One exceptional Vietnamese group is those of Vietnamese who have taken Chinese studies from universities, especially in North Vietnam. Most ethnic Chinese live in southern Vietnam, mainly in Ho Chi Minh City, so Taiwanese companies in North Vietnam have no other choice but to hire Vietnamese who studied Chinese.³⁰ Compared to ethnic Chinese, Taiwanese bosses prefer to hire this kind of Vietnamese because these Vietnamese speak "more standard" Mandarin on the one hand, and they have no ethnic tension with Vietnamese workers. In addition, graduates of Chinese studies in northern Vietnam are oversupplied in the labour market, so the jobs they find in Taiwanese companies are cherished. One staff member at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office said that he graduated in 1980, and was unemployed for a long time due to deteriorating

Sino-Vietnam relations in the 1980s. He got his present job in 1992 when Taiwan set up its first semi-official office in Hanoi. "If Taiwan has no relations with Vietnam," he said, "I would have a hard time finding work."

Why Not Hire Ethnic Vietnamese Chinese?

Then one might ask: why not hire ethnic Chinese Vietnamese as middle strata managers? Some scholars argue that with the help of the Chinese diaspora, Chinese businesspeople can easily enter an alienated social milieu to do business. In their research on the ethnic relations in Taiwanese Malaysian factories, Mak and Kung found that most cadres are ethnic Chinese Malays, who are viewed as a kind of human resource for overseas investment of Taiwanese businesspeople. However, this kind of "ethnic resource" is not based purely on a common diaspora, but on the specific "Taiwan experience," which these ethnic Chinese Malays acquired when they had their tertiary education in Taiwan. This kind of social capital, i.e., education in Taiwan, is not replicable elsewhere.

In our survey, language is also a problem for Taiwanese bosses and managers. The easiest way is to hire a person knowing Mandarin to do the interpretation work. Ethnic Chinese Vietnamese are the best candidates. We found that most companies hire ethnic Chinese to work, but interestingly, we also found that the role they play is very limited. In most cases, they are required to work as interpreters and office staff at the same time, i.e., interpretation is just one of their tasks.

However, Taiwan managers have even complained that they could not work well as interpreters. One common complaint is that their Mandarin is not good enough. Before the unification in 1975, most ethnic Chinese could speak good Mandarin if they went to Taiwan-government sponsored Chinese schools in Saigon from elementary to senior high school. All students attending this educational system were recognized by the Taiwan government, and they could go to Taiwan to continue their tertiary education. The textbooks used there were the same as in Taiwan, so the ethnic Chinese received relatively good Chinese education at that time. After 1975, KMT supported schools were shut down, and after Sino-Vietnam war in 1980, all Chinese schools were closed. The ethnic Chinese generation in the 1980s was not able to learn Chinese publicly, and had to hire private tutors who teach secretly.¹⁰ Because there is a lull period from 1975 to 1990, the younger generation under 30 years of age is not able to speak fluent Mandarin.

If so, communication between Taiwanese managers and Vietnamese relying on these ethnic Chinese would be difficult. Almost every Taiwanese boss there had very bad experience about the quality of the interpretation work of the ethnic Chinese employed. Quite often the ethnic Chinese interpreter does not understand the exact Mandarin translation, and tries to do a second interpretation, which often creates a lot of misunderstanding. As one informant said, one of his Chinese interpreters always put some "flavor" in the translation, which made for serious misunderstanding between managers and workers. This problem was later resolved by the Vietnamese wife of a Taiwanese manager who could speak better Mandarin than an ethnic Chinese.

Another problem with ethnic Chinese is their relations with the Vietnamese. In that society, ethnic Chinese are normally supposed to be in the lower strata, without any political rights. Ethnic Chinese are therefore used to being political dwarfs in the society.

However, if a company hires an ethnic Chinese as a cadre, it will contradict the dominant ideology of higher-ranking Vietnamese and lower-ranking Chinese. Vietnamese workers would not obey Chinese management, and it would be hard for a company's order to reach the lowest strata. Thus the ethnic Chinese cadre does not dare to enforce company rules to avoid provoking Vietnamese resentment. However, from the boss' viewpoint, it will hurt the company's authority, and the rules cannot be followed as the boss would expect. No wonder that most ethnic Chinese in Taiwan companies can work only as general staff and interpreters, not managers. We can say that this embedded social relation discounts these ethnic Chinese as social capital.

Why Chinese Professionals From China?

There are some ways to resolve this dilemma of management. The boss can diligently learn Vietnamese to overcome this problem. This resolution is rare, though not impossible. The second way is to hire older generation Chinese aged 40 or older, who had mostly received formal KMT-oriented Chinese education. Another possibility is to hire the second generation of ethnic Chinese who had studied in Taiwan and stayed there after finishing their study. These ethnic Chinese living in Taiwan still have strong connections in Vietnam, and their next generation could more or less speak Vietnamese. This phenomenon is very similar to Kung's finding in Malaysia that most Taiwanese firms there prefer to hire Chinese Malays who had studied in Taiwan (Mak and Kung, 2000). The company also encourages single Taiwanese managers to marry Vietnamese girls so that they might settle down in Vietnam permanently, and be able to take care of the company for the long term. According to Wang's research, 15% of Vietnamese brides knew their husbands by themselves in Vietnam, and another 15% of them met their Taiwanese spouses through their Taiwanese friends in Vietnam (Wang, 2001). This shows more or less the social effect of Taiwan's investment on local society, and single Taiwanese expatriates are likely to marry Vietnamese girls.

The last resolution is to hire Chinese professionals and technicians to work as short-term migrant workers in Vietnam. When we conducted our fieldwork in 1999, we were surprised by the mass employment of Chinese professionals. Even a small fan factory in Hanoi employs a Chinese lady to be the manager's first secretary. She is paid US\$650 monthly.¹²

Her wage is not exceptionally high. In another company in Ho Chi Minh City, the manager said "there are four Chinese cadres in our company, and their wages range from US\$480 to US\$800, according to their different levels of skill and experience. All of them are university graduates." Another company in Hanoi hires a female Chinese technician for a payment of RMB\$5,200 (about US\$650) plus food allowance. She was transferred from the company's Chinese factory. When a factory was established in 1993, many Chinese came to help the set-up, and went back after their tasks were completed.

So basically a Chinese cadre's wage in Vietnam ranges from US\$450 to US\$800, which is three times to five times higher than their domestic monthly wage. When one considers that the cost of living in Vietnam is lower, these Chinese expatriates will earn much more than in Shanghai. Though wage differentials in the three countries (Vietnam, Taiwan and China) is an important factor in explaining Chinese professional migration

to Vietnam, another factor is more decisive, i.e., communications.

We have mentioned that communication is a problem for Taiwanese bosses or senior managers. There is no such problem in communicating with Chinese professionals. In addition, as Kung found in her study, these Chinese professionals might share the same management culture as Taiwan's companies in China, which will facilitate the functioning of the whole organization's management. In Malaysia, Taiwanese companies hire Taiwan educated ethnic Chinese to be cadres just because these cadres know about Taiwan's way of thinking and management style. In another paper by Sonoda (1998), he also found that "Japanese subsidiaries in Indonesia are set up under the leadership of Malaysian local staff." This Malaysian staff was working for another Japanese company for some years, and has been at this Japanese company for over 10 years. He was assigned to be a general manager in an Indonesian subsidiary.¹³ This case also shows that "Japan experience" is important for a Japanese company when deciding the employment of staff.

This kind of "Taiwan experience" can be learned from the Taiwanese factory in China, especially for big companies. Most big companies have factories in China and in Vietnam. The managers in Taiwan headquarter can allocate its subsidiary technicians and professionals among different factories efficiently. Shifts between China, Vietnam and other countries among company-owned factories will be as common as in a Western multinational corporation. For example, a sports shoe making company has been in China more than ten years. A new Vietnam factory was set up in 1995, and hired 180 Chinese cadres in Ho Chi Minh City when we interviewed the company in July 1999. In the near future, after US-Vietnam trade agreement is signed, this company will expand from 10,000 workers to 60,000, and more Chinese cadres will be sent to Vietnam. Another shoe company in Ha Tay also hires its Chinese professionals from its own factory in Dongguan. This shows the power of Taiwan multinationals to direct staff into different regions to work, and on the other hand, it also shows the importance of social capital "Taiwan experience" in the migration flow. Big Taiwanese companies tend to assign Chinese professionals to work in Southeast Asia, and not vice versa. Language plus Taiwan experience are the determining factors in the selection of professional transients to work overseas.

However, most Taiwanese enterprises in Vietnam are small and medium-size, hence, might not have any factory in China. If so, they would hire Chinese technicians and professionals through personal relations, or through the official Chinese employment office. It is one of the services that China provides to earn foreign reserves (Hou, 2000). Normally the company goes to China to interview the professionals and technicians. If they are qualified, they will be asked to sign a contract, normally for one year. Before these Chinese cadres come to Vietnam, they are required to learn Vietnamese so that they can work as mediators between Taiwanese senior managers and local Vietnamese workers.

Though the Vietnamese government does not allow foreign workers of this type to work there,¹⁴ Taiwanese companies utilize short-term working visas to evade this regulation. Chinese transients have to return to China every six months.

In addition to the advantages of same language communication and same management style, one informant said that "these Chinese managers are also very good in enforcing the rules set by the Taiwanese managers."

Conclusion

Labor migration is now a world trend, and temporary labor migration in Asia in the 1990s is booming along with this region's economic growth. The so-called "professional transients" are one of the migration currents, which comprise two parts: professionals migrating to the USA, Europe and Australia; and professionals migrating to less developed countries. The latter pattern of professional transients is often accompanied by overseas investment. To select a professional from China to work in Vietnam, we argue that social capital, in terms of language and Taiwan experience, plays the most important role.

Most big Taiwanese companies have invested in more than two countries, and the professionals working in these transnational corporations would be assigned to work in different factories located in different countries, which comprises a part of the temporary professionals migration current. These professionals are chosen because they can speak Mandarin and they know the management style of Taiwanese companies in China. We also find that Taiwan's small and medium-scale enterprises in Vietnam hire many Chinese professionals to work as middle level managers. This kind of recruitment is not the same as the internal shift among different companies in the same corporation. The rationale for hiring Chinese professionals to work in Taiwanese Vietnam companies, in addition to the widely known economic factor, i.e., wage differential in the two countries, is the more important factor, which is the social capital that Chinese professionals have. Hiring ethnic Chinese Vietnamese is an alternative way to get over the language problem, but these Chinese are not familiar with Taiwan's management style, and their social capital in the local society, furthermore, is negative, which discourages Taiwan companies from hiring them.

In the future, though Chinese professional transients could help Taiwan companies to manage, we believe that after Vietnamese workers are promoted to higher positions, the importance of these Chinese professionals will diminish, and we expect that this migration pattern will end.

Notes

1. Here I adopt Portes' definition (1995:12) of social capital that refers to the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures.
2. See Jingjibu Tongjichu (Statistics Section, MOEA), *Zhonghuaminguo Taiwandiqu Zhizaoye Touzi Yixiang Diaocha Baogao (Report on Manufacturing Industry's Investment Purposes in Taiwan, ROC)* (Taipei: Economic Ministry, 1992/April), pp. 9-10.
3. This policy was addressed by President Lee Teng-hui in a public speech on 14 September 1996 to limit Taiwan's economic exchanges with China because of China's political intention to "utilise" *Tai Shang* to force Taiwan government to make concessions to China. See Mainland Affairs Commission, *Kuayue Lishe de Honggou-Liangan Jiaoliu Shinian de Huigu yu Qianzhan (Crossing Historical Cleavage—Past and Future of Exchanges Across Taiwan Strait)* (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Commission, 1997), p. 419.
4. According to our fieldwork interviews, one of the KMT controlled companies began their contacts with Vietnamese communist party in 1990, under the instruction of former president Lee Teng-hui. At a conference, one Taiwan scholar revealed that Taiwan government began to have official contacts with Vietnam immediately after Singapore recognized Vietnam. See Liang (2000).
5. See Akira Suehiro, *ajia Kougyouka no Dainamizumu (The Dynamics of Asian Industrialisation)*, in Akira Kudo (ed.), *Nijisseiki Shihonshyugi II (Twentieth-Century Capitalism II)* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995), p. 180.

6. *Ibid.*: p. 181.
7. The six countries are Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Hereafter the term ASEAN will be used to denote these six countries.
8. Jou et al. use similar ways to define "localisation": local sourcing, local development of new products and local management. See Jou et al. (2000: 10).
9. The hierarchy of a normal Taiwan factory organisation is: manual worker – foreman – team head – supervisor (Section head) – assistant manager – senior assistant manager – manager – executive manager – director – executive director – general manager.
10. One informant working at the Taipei School in Ho Chi Minh City said that she paid about ten thousand dong to hire a private Chinese tutor in the 1980s. Only rich families could afford this kind of tuition fee.
11. In fifteen to twenty years, the children of Vietnamese brides marrying Taiwanese who are bilingual might take the managerial positions in these companies. According to Wang's study, there were more than 30,000 Vietnamese brides in the coming next few years. See Wang (2001).
12. She could be seen as a special case because she was brought up in China, and finished her B.A. degree in Vietnam.
13. Here we are obliged to Professor Shigeto Sonoda at Chuo University for offering this valuable information to confirm our findings.
14. We were informed of this by the Vietnam Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei's representative Chu Cong Phung. We would like to thank him for his comments on the early draft of this article.

Reference

- Board of Vocational Training (1999/12/1) *Guest Workers in Taiwan Area, by Occupation*. <http://www.evta.gov.tw/>.
- Castles, Stephen (1998) "New migrations in the Asia-Pacific region: a force for social and political change," *International Social Science Journal*, no 156, pp. 215-227.
- Chan, Anita and Irene Norlund (1999) "Vietnamese and Chinese Labor Regimes: On the Road to Divergence," in Anita Chan, Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet and Jonathan Unger (eds), *Transforming Asian Socialism: China and Vietnam Compared* (Canberra: Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd) pp. 204-228.
- Cheng, Lu-lin (1999) "Yige Banbianchui de Fuxian yu Yincang: Guoji Xielei Shichang Wangluo Chongzuxia de Shengchan Waiyi" ("The Invisible Elbow: semiperiphery and the restructuring of international footwear market") *Taiwan Shehui Yanjiu Jikan (Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Sciences)*, no. 35, pp. 1-46. Taipei.
- China Statistics Department (2000) *CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1998*. <http://www.stats.gov.cn/information/nj98/E231.A.HTM>.
- China Times Newspaper (2000/09/05) "Taiwanren Shanghai: Gubei Ernai Cun, Zhufu Xinzhong Tong" ("Taiwanese in Shanghai: Second Wife Village Gubei, the Heartbreak of Taiwanese Wife") (Taipei: China Times).
- Fei, John C. H. and Gustav Ranis (1964) *Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy* (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin).
- Greenhalgh, Susan (1984) "Networks and Their Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan," *China Quarterly*, no. 99, pp. 529-552.
- Hamilton, Gary G. and Kao Cheng-Shu (1990) "The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business: The Family Firm in Taiwan," *Comparative Social Research*, vol. 12, pp. 135-151.
- Hou, Wenrou (2000) "China's International Migration Policy," paper presented at "The Symposium on Experiences and Challenges of Economic Development in Southeast and East Asia," October 16-17, 2000. Taipei: Academia Sinica.
- Hsiao, Michael H. H., I-chun Kung (1998) Dongnanya Taishang yu Huaren zhi Shangye Wangluo Guanxi (*Business Networks-Between Taishang and Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia*). Taipei: PROSEA, Academia Sinica. Occasional Paper, no. 17.
- Huang, Heh Jason and Steven X. Si (1998) "Yige Waipai Renyuan zhi huo" ("A Perplexed Expatriate") (Kaohsiung: Zhongshan Guanli Pinglun) (*Chun-shan Management Review*), pp. 229-238.
- Huang, Yingzhong, Wu Rongmei and Zhang Guoyi (2000) "Taishang Paizhu Dalu Renyuan zhi Kua Wenhua Xunlian" ("Trans-cultural Training for Taiwanese Expatriates in Mainland China"), in Zheng Chiyan

- and Zhang Zhikai (eds) *Taishang yu Liangan Guanxi Yantaohui (Conference on Taiwanese Businesspeople and Cross-Strait Relations)* (Hong Kong: Research Programme on Ethnicity and Overseas Chinese Economies, Lingnan University).
- Jingjibu Tongjichu (Statistics Section, MOEA, Taiwan) (1995) *Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Zhizaoye Duoajiaohua ji Guojihua Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian (Reports on the Diversification and Internationalization of Manufacturing Industry)*. (Taipei: MOEA).
- (1996) *Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian (Survey on Overseas Investment of the Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1996)*. (Taipei: MOEA)
- (1998) *Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha (Survey on Overseas Investment, Manufacturing Industry)* (Taipei: MOEA).
- (1999) *Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian (Survey on Overseas Investment of the Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1999)* (Taipei: MOEA).
- Khanh, Tran (1993) *The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in Vietnam* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).
- Kung, I-chun (1999) *Kuaguo Touzi Yu Zuqun Guanxi: Taishang zai Maliujia de Xingcheng yu Fazhan (Transnational Investment and Ethnic Relations: Emerge and Development of Taiwan Capital in Malacca)*. Unpublished paper.
- Jiang, Zhijun (2000/10/23) "Cong Baoernai tan Liangan Chonghun Wenti" ("Problems about cross-strait Second Wife") (<http://china.management.org.tw>).
- Jou, Sue-Ching, Dung-Sheng Chen, I-Chun Kung and Yen-Feng Tseng (1999) "Transnationalism and Overseas Investment: The Case of Large Taiwanese Electronics Companies in Malaysia," paper presented at "Symposium on Experiences and Challenges of Economic Development in Southeast Asia" (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica) 2000/10/17-18.
- Lau-Fong Mak and I-Chun Kung (2000/9/11) *The Overseas Chinese Network: Forms and Practices in Southeast Asia*. (Taipei: PROSEA, Academia Sinica), occasional paper no. 26.
- Liang, Jinwen (2000) "1990 Niandai Yuenan yu Woguo Guanxi zhi Fenxi" ("Relations between Vietnam and Taiwan in the 1990s"), unpublished conference paper presented at "Conference on the Relations between China and Vietnam" (Taipei: Institute of Modern History and PROSEA, Academia Sinica).
- Low, Linda (1995) "Population Movement in the Asia Pacific Region: Singapore Perspective," *International Migration Review*, vol. Xxix, no. 3, pp. 745-764.
- MOFTEC (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, China) (2000/11/15) *Duiwai Jingji Hezuo Tongji Shuju (Statistics on External Economic Cooperation)*.
- Portes, Alejandro (1993) "Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration: A Conceptual Overview," in Alejandro Portes (ed.), *The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), pp. 1-41.
- Stahl, Charles W. (2000) "The Impacts of Structural Change on APEC Labour Markets and Their Implications for International Labour Migration," paper presented at "the Symposium on Experiences and Challenges of Economic Development in Southeast and East Asia," (Taipei: Academia Sinica), October 16-17, 2000.
- Tajima, Junko (1998) *Sekai Toshi. Tokyo no Ajjake Yijusha (Asian Residents in Tokyo, World City)* (Tokyo: Gakubonsha).
- Tsay, Ching-lung (1999) "Guoji Laogong yu Jingji Jiegou Tiaozheng: Dongnanya Guojia zhi Yanjiu" ("International Labour and Economic Structures Change: Case Study of Southeast Asia"), paper presented at Conference "Southeast Asian Studies in Taiwan Annual Meeting" (Taipei: Academia Sinica).
- Tseng, Yen-fen (1997) "Juliquan de Shangpinhua: Taiwan de Shangye Yimin Shichang" ("Commodification of Residency: An Analysis of Taiwan's Business Immigration Market") *Taiwan Shehui Yanjiu Jikan (Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies)* no. 27, pp. 37-67.
- Wang, Hong-zen (1999) *Mobility Patterns and Strategies Among Taiwan's Small and Medium-Scale Business People* (Canberra: RSPAS, Australian National University) unpublished Ph. D. diss.
- (2001a) "Another Path to Profit - The Financial Practices of Overseas Taiwanese SMEs," *American Asian Review* (Summer, forthcoming).
- (2001b) "Jiecenghua de 'Shengchanli' Yidong: Hunyin Yimin yu Guonei Laodong Sichang" ("Stratified Migration: Marriage Migration and Domestic Labour Market), *Taiwan Shehui Jikan (Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Sciences)* (forthcoming).